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I AM INTERESTED IN QUESTIONS OF READING AND INTERPRETATION. 
I AM ALSO DRAWN TO ACTOR- NETWORK THEORY AND THE WORK OF  
Bruno Latour. Can these attractions be brought into alignment? To 
what extent can a style of thought that describes itself as empiricist 
and rejects critique speak to the dominant concerns of literary stud-
ies? Can actor- network theory help us think more adequately about 
interpretation? Might it inspire us to become more generous read-
ers? How do literary studies and Latourian thought engage, enlist, 
seduce, or speak past each other? What duels, rivalries, intrigues, 
appropriations, or love affairs will ensue?
While Latour acknowledges a debt to the Greimasian model of 
actor or actant, his explicit references to literature have been largely 
a matter of passing observations and lapidary remarks. Meanwhile, 
Latour’s work ignores or explicitly rejects many of the themes that 
have occupied literary scholars in recent decades: representation, the 
linguistic turn, textuality, the symbolic, negativity, alterity. In certain 
respects, it seems to resist being taken up as a generalizable method 
at all. In the dialogue at the center of Reassembling the Social, a hap-
less doctoral student drops in on a Latour avatar during office hours, 
seeking advice about how to apply actor- network theory to his disser-
tation, only to encounter obstacles at every turn. Actor- network the-
ory, it turns out, is a theory not so much about how to study things 
as about “how not to study them—or rather, how to let the actors 
have some room to express themselves” (142). How might this radical 
empiricism, as Latour calls it with a nod to William James, be recon-
ciled with the theory- and text- based orientation of literary studies? 
In particular, how could it help us reimagine practices of reading and 
interpretation? The prospects, at first glance, do not look promising.
Yet this pact of mutual noninterference is reaching its end, as 
Latour’s work receives ever more attention in literary studies. The 
most lively fields in literary criticism include animal studies, thing 
theory, ecological thought, the posthuman—all fields premised on 
the intertwinement and codependence of human and nonhuman 
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actors. Given obvious affinities and shared 
concerns between these fields and Latour’s 
work, it is becoming harder to avoid actor- 
network theory, whether as an ally to be em-
braced or a rival to be denounced. Rejecting 
the divisions of subject/ object, nature/ cul-
ture, thought/ matter, and language/ world, 
Latour’s work presumes the equal ontological 
salience of all classes of being in a mutually 
composed world. Hence the rhetorical force 
of the “Latour litany” (Bogost): the quasi- 
surrealist lists of disparate entities—straw-
berries, stinkbugs, quarks, corgis, tornadoes, 
Tin- Tin and Captain Haddock—that convey, 
through their promiscuous entanglement and 
equinanimous copresence, the equal footing 
of nonhuman and human actors. Actor, in 
this sense, is not freighted with assumptions 
about intention, consciousness, or autonomy 
but designates any and all phenomena whose 
existence makes a difference.
Actors exist not in themselves but only 
through their networks of association. Ties, 
in a Latourian framework, are not limits to 
action but a fundamental condition for ac-
tion. The relevant distinction is not between 
freedom and bondage but between kinds 
of linkage: “As to emancipation, it does not 
mean ‘freed from bonds’ but well-attached” 
(Reassembling 218). Actor- network theory 
is thus a matter of tracing out the paths by 
which entities of all kinds—from scallops 
to subway trains, from springboks to box-
springs—are constituted by their relations. 
Given the hybridity of networks, whatever 
is transmitted is also translated, transposed, 
and transformed. It is hardly surprising, 
then, that actor- network theory is sometimes 
described as a sociology of mediation.
Yet this leveling of phenomena through 
their incorporation into networks also poses 
a difficulty for the uptake of actor- network 
theory as a method in literary studies. What, 
then, accounts for the distinctiveness of lit-
erature? How might a Latourian style of 
thought connect to what most literary critics 
care about? How could it help us read? To be 
sure, actor- network theory has certain affini-
ties to the growing field of cultural ecology 
as well as to cultural studies and its method 
of articulation.1 At first glance, however, it 
seems removed from the traditional concerns 
and methods of literary studies, including a 
focus on interpretation. The interaction be-
tween Latour and literary studies thus looks 
like one of those one- sided wrestling matches 
that canny promoters rigged in advance. Ei-
ther themes from actor- network theory are 
incorporated into existing practices of close 
reading (the critic traces out the movement 
and interconnection of actants within the 
confines of a literary work), or actor- network 
theory draws us toward a sociology of net-
works that can be exceptionally illuminating 
but seems remote from the interpretative con-
cerns of literary studies. Is it possible to come 
up with a less lopsided form of interaction?
Latour’s most recent book speaks di-
rectly to this question. Reflecting on the in-
fluence and legacy of actor- network theory, 
Latour ruefully notes that the anthropologist 
of networks “has lost in specificity what she 
has gained in freedom of movement. . . . As 
she studies segments from Law, Science, The 
Economy or Religion, she begins to feel that 
she is saying almost the same thing about all 
of them: namely that they are ‘composed in 
a heterogeneous fashion of unexpected ele-
ments revealed by the investigation’” (Inquiry 
35). Here Latour speaks to the problem at 
hand: that an overemphasis on the varying 
associations among multiple actors results in 
a flattening of persistent differences. How can 
we acknowledge the plurality and intercon-
nectivity of phenomena while also honoring 
the salient differences between networks? 
How do we attend to both mixtures and con-
trasts? Such a reorientation would seem nec-
essary if Latour’s work is to speak well to the 
concerns of literary critics.
Latour develops the notion of “mode of 
existence” (taken from Étienne Souriau) to 





















speak about what distinguishes science, law, 
technology, religion—and art. In contrast to 
cartographic metaphors such as field or do-
main, with their connotations of discrete and 
bounded spaces, mode of existence identifies 
differences without delineating borders. We 
can agree, for example, that literary texts are 
connected to countless things that are not lit-
erature, while also acknowledging that there 
cluster around literature certain ways of talk-
ing, experiencing, acting, interpreting, and 
evaluating. It is crucial, Latour remarks, to 
speak about a mode of existence in its own 
language: to engage its criteria of verification 
and value, its conditions of felicity and unfe-
licity. At the same time, however, his project 
is also one of redescription: the theories we 
hold about these various modes of existence 
often do not match up very well with our ex-
periences and practices.
These arguments speak to my interest 
in the uses of literature: the forms of attach-
ment through which texts entice and enlist 
us, surprise and seduce us (Felski, Uses). Such 
attachments testify to our lives as social be-
ings, while inviting us to reflect on the dis-
tinctive qualities of works of art: what spurs 
us to pick up a book or to become engrossed 
in a film. I share Latour’s conviction that pre-
vailing styles of scholarly analysis often fail to 
capture the nature of our entanglement with 
texts, as a precondition for forging better ac-
counts of why these texts matter. For exam-
ple, Latour emphasizes the realness of works 
of art as well as that of the fictional characters 
that inhabit them—honoring intuitions that 
are often waved away as naive by professional 
critics. We have already noted his lack of in-
terest in the language- world distinction; the 
question of whether fiction ref lects or dis-
torts a social context disappears from view. 
Neither, however, are we sealed off from re-
ality by an impermeable screen of significa-
tion or textuality. Rather, the task of the critic 
is to follow the actors along the networks of 
words, things, ideas, images, and practices 
through which they are constituted. In this 
sense, poems and paintings possess as much 
ontological reality as nitrogen or Napoleon: 
they are actors knotted into forms of asso-
ciation that enlist our interest and help make 
things happen. The beings of fiction, Latour 
remarks, do not “direct our attention toward 
illusion, toward falsity, but toward what is 
fabricated, consistent, real” (Inquiry 238). 
As such phrasing suggests, for actor- network 
theory realness and fabrication are connected 
rather than opposed; that Emma Bovary was 
made by Gustave Flaubert and a subsequent 
stream of critics, translators, commentators, 
filmmakers, and audiences does not decrease 
or diminish her reality but makes it possible.2
Because agency is composite, actor- 
network theory also steers us away from 
monocausal explanations of what and how 
a text signifies. Who is fabricating whom? 
Agency is distributed, uncertain, and hard 
to pin down. Against a view of meaning as 
determined only by readers or interpretative 
communities or social fields, Latour also in-
sists on the unmistakable pressure and power 
of the text: “A work of art engages us, and if it 
is quite true that it has to be interpreted, at no 
point do we have the feeling that we are free 
to do ‘whatever we want’ with it. . . . Someone 
who says ‘I love Bach’ . . . receives from Bach, 
we might almost say ‘downloads’ from Bach, 
the wherewithal to appreciate him” (Inquiry 
241). Works of art invite and incite us, in ways 
that we do not always expect and may not be 
able to predict. They orient us in certain ways 
and draw us down interpretative or percep-
tual paths. They possess their own ontological 
dignity instead of just being screens on which 
we project our preexisting fantasies and ide-
ologies. In this way, Latour provides a way of 
accounting for the sturdiness and liveliness 
of texts as nonhuman actors that move across 
time as well as space (Felski, “Context”).
And yet works of art also need our de-
votion. Their existence depends on their 
being taken up by readers or viewers, as 





















 intermediaries through which they must pass, 
without whom they will soon be reduced to 
“failure, loss, or oblivion: abandoned stage 
sets, rolled up canvases, now useless acces-
sories, incrusted palettes, moth- eaten tutus” 
(Inquiry 248). Hence the real and irresolvable 
ambiguities of agency: we make works of art 
even as they make us. What is the difference 
between being carried away by a narrative and 
by a subway train? It is not that one experi-
ence is false or illusory while the other is real, 
remarks Latour: rather, the former requires 
our solicitude and active participation in a 
way that the latter does not. A critical ethos of 
attentiveness, respect, and generosity comes 
to the fore, though shorn of any transcenden-
tal trappings. Aesthetic experience does not 
oppose or reject society (this language makes 
no sense in a Latourian framework) but is 
created out of networks of association: an art-
work acquires its singularity from its social 
ties, not from being opposed to them.
Attachment is thus an indispensable term 
in the Latourian lexicon. We become attached 
to art objects in a literal sense: the dog- eared 
paperback that rides around town in a jacket 
pocket, the lyrics streaming through the 
headphones glued to a person’s ears, the 
Matisse postcard propped up on a desk that 
is transported from one sublet to the next. 
Such texts form part of an Umwelt: a body- 
centered web of relations to phenomena that 
bear meaning for us. Attachment, of course, 
also points us toward the adhesiveness of af-
fect: being entranced by a work of fiction, 
dreaming in front of a painting—or falling in 
love with the protocols of critical theory and 
academic reading. Reason cannot be filtered 
out from the ebb and swirl of moods and dis-
positions: matters of fact are also matters of 
concern. Through diction and tone as much 
as argument, Latour draws us away from the 
prototype of the knowing, ironic, detached 
critic. And finally attachment is an ontologi-
cal fact, an inescapable condition of existence. 
Critical thought often dreams of a subject 
without ties, of breaking free of restraints to 
achieve emancipation. The choice, however, 
is not between attachment and detachment, 
between determination and freedom, but 
between good and poor attachments, those 
that help us and those that seek to do us harm 
(“Factures” 22).
What might this mean for questions of 
literature and interpretation? Actor- network 
theory emphasizes both the necessity and the 
sheer difficulty of description, of attending to 
an empirical world that often resists or refutes 
our assumptions. Objectivity is not owned by 
the positivists, Latour remarks; that we are 
shaped by our situation does not prevent us 
from giving better or worse accounts of things 
at hand (Reassembling 146). This means tak-
ing care not to conjure textual meanings out 
of preexisting assumptions or explanations—
honoring and detailing the singular features 
of a text as well as the specific routes along 
which it travels. Actor- network theory does 
not exclude the political—it is deeply inter-
ested in conflicts, asymmetries, struggles—
but its antipathy to reductionism means 
that political discourse cannot serve as a 
metalanguage into which everything can be 
translated. The task is to account for as many 
actors as possible, to be specific about forms 
of causation and connection (which are also 
forms of translation), instead of hitching a 
free ride on a preexisting theoretical vocabu-
lary: the familiar isms waiting eagerly in the 
wings, all too ready to take on a starring role.3
Description, however, is not opposed to 
interpretation. Latour is certainly impatient 
with a hermeneutic philosophy that brags 
about the interpretative ingenuity of the hu-
man subject vis- à- vis a mute and inert world. 
Still, he does not reject interpretation so 
much as expand and extend it: “hermeneu-
tics is not a privilege of humans, but, so to 
speak, a property of the world itself” (Reas-
sembling 245).4 That is to say, countless enti-
ties are engaged in interaction, mediation, 
adaptation, and translation: the world is not a 





















dead zone of reification but as rife with ambi-
guity as any modernist poem (Connor). And 
yet, within this expanded frame, how human 
beings make sense of poems or paintings 
retains its salience, for it offers clues to art’s 
specific mode of existence. Interpretation, we 
might say, constitutes one powerful mode of 
attachment, whose mechanisms are not well 
captured by the prevailing assumptions of 
literary studies. Within a Latourian frame-
work, we do not probe below the surface of 
a text to retrieve disavowed or repressed 
meanings, nor do we stand back from a text 
to “denaturalize” it and expose its social 
constructedness (Felski, “Digging Down”). 
The distinction between a knowing critic 
and an unknowing text—or a naive reader—
crumbles away. Reading becomes a matter of 
composing and cocreating, of forging links 
between things that were previously uncon-
nected. (Think, for example, of the impact of 
the “madwoman in the attic” trope on the re-
search agenda of early feminism, forging new 
and powerful networks of attachments be-
tween a cohort of female critics entering the 
academy and a certain corpus of nineteenth- 
century texts.) To interpret something is to 
add one’s voice to that of the text: to negoti-
ate, appropriate, elaborate, translate, and re-
late. The emphasis is on acts of making rather 
than unmaking, composition rather than cri-
tique, substantiating rather than subverting; 
as Graham Harman remarks, negativity plays 
virtually no role in Latour’s thinking.5
The emphasis on distributed agency, 
moreover, has implications for the frame 
of analysis. What counts as relevant to the 
meaning of a work of art? Numerous pos-
sibilities crowd into view: “the whims of 
princes and sponsors . . . as well as the quality 
of a keystroke on the piano, the reactions of a 
public to an opening night performance, the 
scratches on a vinyl recording or the heart-
aches of a diva” (Latour, Inquiry 243). In-
stead of a wall separating the inside of a text 
from its outside, we are faced with a crowd of 
squabbling, jostling, interconnected actors 
playing their parts. If we take the lessons of 
actor- network theory to heart, we are thus less 
inclined to pore over a single text to draw out 
its hidden plenitude of aesthetic, philosophi-
cal, or sociopolitical truth—to buy into the 
ethical charisma of the literary critic as privi-
leged messenger (Love). Yet actor- network 
theory also pulls out the rug from under the 
sociologist’s dispassionate analysis of a liter-
ary system: from such a bird’s- eye view, ev-
erything looks remarkably similar, things blur 
together, and essential details are lost. Neither 
close reading, then, nor distant reading but 
what we can call mid- level reading:6 an ap-
proach not grounded in the revelatory value 
of a single work or in a general notion of soci-
ety or literary system but positioned on a scale 
between the two. Interpretation? Yes, without 
a doubt—but of objects and mediations as well 
as literary works, a practice of lateral reading 
across multiple texts rather than deep and 
intensive reading of a single text (Outka). On 
the one hand, a more capacious view of what 
counts as relevant to literary analysis; on the 
other hand, an insistence that a text cannot be 
manhandled into the role of a mirror, index, 
or symptom of a social whole.
The alliance of actor- network theory 
and literary studies, like all alliances, re-
quires translation, tinkering, and diplomacy. 
Rather than apply Latour to literary studies 
in one- sided fashion, we do better to elucidate 
overlapping interests and common concerns. 
And here, I have argued, questions of reading 
and interpretation are not inimical to actor- 
network theory, even if they take on differing 
guises. Instead of engaging in a hermeneutics 
of suspicion, we conceive of interpretation as 
a form of mutual making or composing. In-
stead of stressing our analytic detachment, we 
own up to our attachments, shrugging off the 
tired dichotomy of vigilant critic versus na-
ive reader. Instead of demystifying aesthetic 
absorption, we see that experience as a key to 
the distinctive ways in which art solicits our 





















attention. In this scenario, in short, literary 
studies is neither safeguarded nor subverted; 
it is reoriented and recomposed.7
Notes
1. See, e.g., Kelleter’s illuminating account of The 
Wire as a text coauthored by a network of agencies.
2. On the reality of fiction, see also Warner’s helpful 
discussion.
3. For good accounts of the political dimensions of 
Latour’s work, see Piekut; Harman, Bruno Latour.
4. In recent essays and interviews, Latour points to 
the influence of his doctoral training in biblical exegesis 
on his subsequent thinking (e.g., “Coming Out” 601).
5. As Harman puts it with his usual verve, “The very 
idea of a Latourian treatise on negativity makes me burst 
into laughter” (“Importance” 34).
6. I coin this phrase by analogy with Frow’s discus-
sion of mid- level concepts in the sociology of literature.
7. Muecke offers an interesting example of such re-
composition. I am thankful to Stephen Muecke, Benja-
min Piekut, and Bill Warner for their helpful comments.
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